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Notes and Comments
INSANITY-AN ARGUMENT FOR PARTIAL
RESPONSIBILITY
"The memorials of our jurisprudence are written all over with
cases in which those who are now understood to have been insane
have been executed as criminals." As Professor Glueck points out,
the above passage from Bishop probably presents but "one side of the
shield."2 He indicates that numerous persons have doubtlessly been
acquitted on the plea of insanity although they were not properly to
be classified as mentally diseased or feebleminded. 3
Glueck believes that the most outstanding characteristic of the
law of insanity, as found in the cases in the various state reports, is
"confusion." He states:
"Perhaps in no other branch of American law is there so
much disagreement as to fundamentals and so many contradictory
decisions in the same jurisdictions. Not a modem text or compilation
begins the discussion of the subject of insanity and its relation to the
criminal law without a doleful reference to the chaos in this field."'
Chaotic uncertainty has characterized the law of insanity since
1848 when the English judges promulgated the rules in McNaughtons
Case.5 There judges rounded up a mass of early and out-moded con-
ceptsO and applied them in the abstract.7 It was after, rather than dur-
'1 BisHop, CnNmA LAw 287 (9th ed., 1923).
2 GLUECK, MENTAL DisonE AND THE CamnNAL LAw 187 (1925).3 ibid.
4Ibid.
'10 Clark and F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). McNaughton was said to be
suffering from an insane delusion that Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel was plotting
against him. By reason of this delusion, the defendant set out to kill Sir Robert.
By mistake, however, he killed one Drummond, the prime minister's secretary.
The jury found McNaughton "Not guilty on the ground of insanity." Popular
excitement and dissatisfaction over the case led the House of Lords to pose five
questions concerning insanity to the Judges. The answers to these questions have
become known as the McNaughton Rules. See WEmorEN, I~sANrry AS A DE-
FENSE IN CnimiNAL LAW 25 et seq. (1933).
'Note 40 Ky. L. J. 311 (1952). "Both before and after that time the various
definitions of a madman termed him a brute or wild beast, a child less than 14,
or one unable to number twenty pence."
" Id. at 312. "The rules laid down in 1843 by the justices in McNaughton's
Case have been the subject of numerous and varied criticisms. First of all it is
pointed out that the rules were laid down extra-judically, i.e., they were simply
the replies of judges to certain questions put to them not during but after
MoNaughton's Case. They were not based on any one case and the judges were
obliged to law down the law without hearing evidence or argument of counsel.
It was on this point that Justice Maule, the lone dissenter among the 15 judges,
took issue with his colleagues." See Mmumarrn, INSArrY AS A Cmm NAL DEFENSE
29 (1931).
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ing MeNaughton's Case that the judges wrote answers to a series of
questions propounded by the House of Lords. In a composite answer to
the second and third questions the Court laid down the modem test
for insanity:8
"In all cases ... it must be clearly proved that, at the
time of committing the act, the party accused was labouring under
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know
the nature and quality of the act he was committing or if he did
know it that he did not know that it was wrong."
The view of the American jurisdictions which follow this so-called
"right-and-wrong" test is that, for the purpose of determining respon-
sibility for crime, individuals are to be divided into two classes only,
viz., the wholly sane and the wholly insane, a classification with which
the medical profession bitterly disagrees. 9 The courts in applying
the McNaughton rules have presupposed that there is a clear demar-
cation between persons who are mentally sound and those who are
unsound and that the ability to distinguish right from wrong is the
magic line that can be infallibly drawn in all cases. Justice Murphy
sounded the battle cry against this manifest absurdity in his dissent
in the recent case of United States v. Fisher:'0
". the frontiers of criminal law . . . are slowly but
undeniably expanding under the impact of our increasing knowledge
of psychology and psychiatry."
"The existence of general impairment, or partial insanity,
is a scientifically established fact. There is no absolute or clear-cut
dichotomous division of the inhabitants of this world unto the sane
and the insane. 'Between the two extremes of sanity and insanity
lies every shade of disordered or deficient mental condition, grading
imperceptibly one into another."'
Meredith indicates the wide range and variation of mental ab-
normalities when he writes that:
"It has been said that one in every hundred persons is
'insane in one way or another' and that the civilized world is full of
'McNaughton's Case is still followed by the majority of jurisdictions as the
test for insanity as a defense in criminal law. 1 BiumicK, LAw OF Cnmrms 277
(1946); Glueck, op. cit. supra note 2, at 214. See SAYBE, CASES ON CIMINAL
LAw 487, n. 1 (1927).
, Taylor, Partial Insanity as Affecting the Degree of Crime-A Commentary on
Fisher v. United States, 34 GCaF. L. REv. 625, 629 (1946); 1 WHAMTON, CnMM-
NAL LAw 85 (1912); WHrrz, INsANIT Am nm  umAM LA-V 89 (1923).
10328 U.S. 463 (1945).
' Id. at 491. See Weihofen, Partial Insanity and Criminal Intent, 24 ILL.
L. REV. 505, 508 (1930). WHrrE, op. cit. supra note 9, writes: "To conceive
that an individual is either absolutely responsible or absolutely irresponsible is to
fly in the face of perfectly patent facts that are in everybody s individual experi-
ence and is only comparable to such beliefs of the Middle Ages that a person is
possessed of a devil or is not possessed of a devil, and therefore is or is not a
free moral agent." •
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men and women who are 'warped"' and in whom a varying degree
of mental unsoundness exists."s
And yet the courts still employ a century old test for insanity which
leaves no room for intermediary stages of mental aberration. A de-
fendant is either to be judged insane and thus not responsible for his
criminal acts or else he must be declared totally sane and thereby
strictly accountable for his wrongdoings. 14 In order to be excused
from responsibility, the offender must be suffering from some mental
disorder that will fit the McNaughton test.15 If the disturbance is
such that the defendant still knows the nature and quality of the act
and that it is wrong, he must suffer the full consequences of his act.
He must be either convicted or acquitted in cases calling for an inter-
mediary determination. -This refusal to recognize a middle ground
is still followed by the majority of jurisdictions today and constitutes
a serious objection to the McNaughton rules.16
The archaic idea that an individual is either sane or insane de-
veloped at a time when popular thought conceived of physical disease
as a state entirely different from that of health.17 But there is no sharp
I GRasSmr, Tim SEMI-INSANE AND THE SEM-REsPoNSrax. 272 (Jelliffe
translation, 1907) states, however, ". . . the semi-insane are very often intelligent,
so intelligent in fact, that they may be men of talent and even of genius ...
(Nevertheless) the semi-insane are sick people and . . .they must be cared for."
' M wEDrr, op. cit. supra note 7, at ix (preface).
' "The old common law authorities took the ground that sanity and insanity
are states as clearly and absolutely distinguishable as are coverture and non-
coverture; and that men are either wholly sane, so as to be wholly responsible, or
wholly insane, so as to be wholly irresponsible. This principle, however, is now
abandoned as based on a psychological untruth. There are many degrees both of
sanity and insanity; and the two states approach each other in imperceptible
graduation, melting into each other . . .as day melts into night." WHAnToN,
op. cit. supra, note 9, as quoted by Taylor, op. cit. supra note 9, at 629.
The famous French psychologist, GRAsSET, op. cit. supra, note 12 at 34
et seq., describes and ridicules the so-called "two block" theory which holds that
men are divided into two groups, the sane and the insane. No such convenient
division may be made such as in the axiom that "All those in a cemetery are
dead, and all those outside of the cemetery are living." In Chapter 3 (77-179)
he presents a large collection of medical evidence as to the existence and nature
of partial insanity. He writes: "There is a gradation and continuity from the
perfectly reasonable being to the wholly insane. In a general way, it is im os-
sible to draw any absolute and fixed line of demarcation between physiologica or
normal phenomena and pathological or abnormal disturbance. Id. at 51.
s "Psychiatrists . .. are convinced that a crime may be the result of mental
disease and yet the criminal's faculties of reason, his powers to premeditate and
to scheme may be unimpaired, and indeed in many cases strengthened, by his
mental condition. Legally, however, unless his powers to distinguish right from
wrong, and his ability to comprehend the nature and consequences of his act are
impaired, he is not immune from punishment." Note 88 YALE L. J. 368, 875
(1929).
19 Taylor, op. cit. supra, note 9; Weihofen and Overholser, Mental Disorder
Affecting the Degree of Crime, 56 YALE L. J. 959 (1947).
1 JACOiY, TuE UNsoUND MnD AND Tn LAW 53 et seq. (1918): "Even a
century ago the idea that disease was a state entirely different from that of health
was widespread among physicians, as well as among people in general. Disease
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dividing line between health and diseases. As Dr. Jacoby expresses it:
"Only when the divergence from health is very pro-
nounced and conditions have changed abruptly, as is the case in
acute poisoning or infectious processes, does the contrast become
so manifest that it is recognized by everyone as a state of disease.""
Similar considerations arose in connection with illnesses of a mental
rather than a physical nature. "From eccentricities of character to
paranoia, or from excited exhilaration to maniacal furor, the distance
is long and the intermediary steps are numerous." 19 Dr. Jacoby sums
up the problem in saying:
"But in the domain of jurisprudence, too, the disregard of
individual peculiarities has often caused the most dire error; and
this applies more particularly to those Anglo-Saxon countries' whose
statutes are still based upon the assumption that a person is either
mentally healthy and entirely responsible, or else insane and entirely
irresponsible. That between these two extremes there exist grada-
tions, each characterized by a greater or lesser restriction of free
determination of the will and responsibility, is a fact which has not
yet been recognized to any extent by Anglo-Saxon jurisprudefce. " 2
The learned English judges of the last century who promulgated
the McNaughton rules appear to have had but halting faith in the
efficacy and all inclusiveness of the tests they were setting forth.22 In
announcing the questions that should be submitted to a jury they
added that they should be "accompanied with such observations and
was looked upon, so to say, as a hostile agent, and not infrequently its presence
was attributed to demonic influence. Virchow was the first to advocate the view
that processes of disease are manifestations entirely analogous to the normal pro-
cesses of life, differing from them only in degree."
' Id. at 53. "It is quite as impossible to make a precise distinction between
health), and sick individuals as it is to divide the human race into two categories,
the intelligent and the stupid." Id. at 54.
"Id. at 59. In effect, mental disorder is nothing more than a different type
of physical disease. See id. at 88 et seq. See also id. at 81 et seq. for an analysis
of tyes of mental disorder and borderline cases.
VEIOFEN, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 99 declares: "This rule that where a
defendant is somewhat disordered mentally, but not to such a degree as to relieve
him from responsibility for crime, his punishment should be reduced, has been
adopted in the codes of some continental countries . . ." He quotes the ITALiAN
PENAL CODE (ART. 47) as stating that if the defendants mental infirmity was
"such as greatly to diminish responsibility, without, however, excluding it, the
punishment prescribed for the crime committed is to be reduced." Similar pro-
visions, he declares, are to be found in the codes of Denmark, Finland, Greece,
Japan, Norway, Sweden, and the Swiss cantons. See also JACOBY, op. cit. supra,
note 17 at 48.
2'JACOBY, Op. cit. supra, note 17 at 62. He continues: "Even where it hasbeen dlemonstrated that a particular case is one occupying the borderline, being
neither normal nor distinctly pathological and in which therefore responsibility
must be assumed to be attenuated, a judge under existing laws will be placed in
the difficult position of having to decide either for mental health and entire re-
sponsibility or for insanity and total irresponsibility. In the first instance the de-
cision would be too lenient, in the latter too severe.
" GLIJEcE, op. cit. supra, note 2 at 427.
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explanations as the circumstances of each particular case may require."
Did the judges mean to imply that certain cases might not be solved
by an application of the right-and-wrong test? Did they intend to
suggest that certain cases would call for other tests and that there
was room to consider intermediary states of mental abnormality lying
between complete sanity and complete insanity? If this was their
intention, it has not been fulfilled.
The judges did, in fact, mention a type of partial insanity. In
their separate answers to the first and fourth questions, the judges
promulgated what appears to be a separate test for such cases. All
four questions propounded by the House of Lords, though worded
differently, asked one thing: What is the law respecting the criminal
responsibility of persons afflicted with insane delusion? 3 While, as
noted above, the judges prefaced their composite answer to questions
two and three with the phrase "in all cases", in replying separately
to questions one and four, a more limited situation was apparently
envisioned. The judges wrote:
"Assuming your Lordship's inquiries are confined to those
persons who labour under such partial delusions only, and are not
in other respects insane . . ."
Thus the court contemplated a circumstance of partial insanity.
Where this particular type of mental state existed, the judges an-
nounced that the defendant:
... must be considered in the same situation as to
responsibility as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists
were real."'
Enormous controversy has arisen as to the effect to be given this
language. Some nine jurisdictions have considered this as a separate
test for a separate mental condition called insane delusion, retaining
the right-and-wrong test for all other forms of insanity.20 The remain-
WEMOFEN, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 73. A fifth question dealt with the
admissability of expert testimony and need not be considered here. See id. at 27.
"Supra, note 5.
Ibid. The judges went on to say: "For example, if under the influence of
his delusion he psuposes another man to be in the act of attempting to take away
his life, and he kills that man, as he supposes in self-defence, he would be exempt
from punishment. If his delusion was that the deceased had inflicted a serious
injury on his character and fortune, and he killed him in revenge for such sup-
posed injury, he would be liable to punishment."
"WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 75. He lists cases at 70, 71, n. 2 and 4.
See also GLUEOX, p . cit .supra, note 2 at 246. Before the opinion in McNaugh-
ton's Case, Lord Erskine argued eloquently that "Delusion, therefore, where there
is no frenzy or raving madness, is the true character of insanity." Lord Kenyon,
the judge, then stated: "With regard to the law, as it has been laid down, there
can be no doubt upon earth." Hadfield's Case, 27 How. St. Tr. 1281, 314 (1800).
See GLUEcic, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 245.
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ing jurisdictions apparently take the view that despite their inconsis-
tencies, the four answers are to be taken together, rather than separ-
ately, and that the general right-and-wrong test is to prevail also in
the case of insane delusion. 27 They regard the insane delusion test
as merely an illustration of the application of the right-and-wrong
doctrine.
28
A stout argument that is usually raised against the above "special
facts" rule is that there are no persons who suffer from "partial de-
lusion only, and are not in other respects insane."2 9 It is declared
that one who suffers from an insane delusion is insane, and that one
may not be sane in one respect and insane in another.30 It is no doubt
quite true that the idea of phrenology, upon which this concept was
originally based,31 is outmoded and scientifically fallacious.3 2 The
theory of phrenology declares that the mind is divided into compart-
ments, each having its own location in the brain, and each functioning
independently of the others.33 Weihofen declares that:
"Today phrenology has been relegated to the gypsy for-
tune-tellers of the ghettos, but the nule of law which it engendered
still holds the respect of jurists."M
Assuming, then, the fundamental fallacy of this theory, it can
readily be seen why enormous criticism has been raised against the
rule of McNaughton's Case to the effect that insane delusion is a de-
fense only when the facts of the delusion would be a defense if they
were true.35 An insane delusion is not something separate and apart
" VEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 75. See Banks v. Comm., 145 Ky. 800,
141 S.W. 380 (1911); Comm. v. Calhoun, 238 Pa. 474, 86 AUt. 472 (1913); Peo-
ple v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 110 N.E. 945 (1915).
's WmFor, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 74.
Id. at 76, 411. See also GLUJECK, op. cit. supra, note 2 at 248, 430; II
STEPHEN, HISTOrY OF THE CRmuNAL LAw oF ENGLAND 160, 163 (1883); Keedy,
Insanity and Criminal Responsibility, 30 HAsv. L. BEv. 535, 558.
1 VEIOFEN, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 76 et seq. Keedy, 2 Jour. Crim. Law
539 (1911) quotes Dr. Mercier, a distinguished psychiatrist and psychologist, as
saying: "There is not, and never has been, a person who labors under partial de-
lusion only and is not in other respects insane." See also GLUECK, op. cit. supra,
note 2 at 249 et seq.
" E V oN, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 77, says that the doctrine of phrenology,
which holds that the mind is divided into compartments, each having its own
location in the brain, and each functioning independently of the others, was un-
doubtedly the source of this concept.
W~iHOFEN, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 77, 411.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 78.
""As has been frequently pointed out by medical and other writers, this was
an absurd solution of an impossible problem (i.e., the solution of the Judges of
England of the problem posed by the Lords in their questions); and the most that
can be said for it is that, in some cases, it might chance to work no substantial
injustice." SmRouD, MENS REA 78, as quoted by GLuEcx, op. cit. supra, note 2 at
250.
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from the mind as a whole, but is rather one symptom of certain forms
and stages of mental disease.3 6 As Bishop phrases it:
"... delusion of any kind is strongly indicative of a
generally diseased mind. And doubtless sometimes if not always it
does in fact extend beyond the precise point we have supposed,
whether perceptibly to the casual eye or not." '
With this "unity of mind" theory clearly before us, it is not difficult
to visualize the absurdity of a rule by which a person acting under an
insane delusion is to be judged as if the facts of the delusion were real.
"It judges the insane man by the same standard as the sane man . . .
In other words, the law accepts the delusion, but requires him to
reason about it as a sane man."
3 8
However, there is a danger in stating without reservation that a
mind is a unity, that there is no partial insanity, and that disease of
the mind is a disease of the entire mind. This suggests the untenable
proposition that one must be either completely sane or completely
insane. Weihofen indicates that a distinction is to be drawn between
the "partial insanity" to which the judges refer in McNaughton's Case
and "partial insanity" as "mental impairment which is not so complete
as to render its victim irresponsible for his criminal acts."3 9 The dis-
"Delusion is not an independent phenomenon, which may exist in a mind
otherwise sane, but is an external symptom, indicative of a much deeper mental
disturbance." WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 78. "Insanity is a disease of
the mind and delusion a symptom of the disease." Ryan v. People, 60 Colo. 425,
153 Pac. 756, 757 (1915).
"The theory . . . is that an isolated delusion lies imbedded, like a foreign
body, in a brain which is and remains normal all around. As against this view
modern science endorses the simile of Jules Falret, who likens a delusion to a
parasitic plant 'which will not spring up and grow in an unsuitable soil, and the
soil which is suited to it is insanity; 'let the soil be changed to one of sanity,'
rightly remarks Maudsley, 'in other words, let the mind apart from the delusion
be sound, and this will dwindle and die."' OPPENREMER, CRMINAL REsPON-
siBiLrry oF LtNA-ncs 215, 216, as quoted by GLUEC], op. cit. supra, note 2 at 250.
'Quoted by GLXMCK, op. cit. supra, note 2 at 251. "The facts that a man
stammers and that the pupils of his eyes are of different sizes are in themselves no
excuse for crime, but they may be the symptoms of general paralysis of the in-
sane, which is one of the most fatal forms of the disease. Why should not the
existence of a delusion be as significant as the existence of a stammer?" II STEPH-
EN, op. cit. supra, note 29 at 157.
'WEHOFEN, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 75, 76. It has even been held in one
case that an insane delusion that the defendant acted in self-defense is no excuse
unless the belief was reasonable! State v. Shippey, 10 Minn. 223 (1865). In a
vituperative attack upon this type of injustice, Judge Somerville wrote: "If he
dare fail to reason, on the supposed facts embodied in the delusion, as perfectly
as a sane man could do on a like state of realities, he receives no mercy at the
hands of the law. It exacts of him the last pound of flesh . . . If this has been
the law heretofore, it is time it should be no longer. It is not only opposed to the
known facts of modern medical science, but it is a hard and unjust rule to be
applied to the unfortunate and providential victims of disease." Parsons v. State,
81 Ala. 577, 595 (1886).
Op. cit. supra, note 5 at 412, 413.
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tinction between the two concepts was pointed out as early as 1650
by Lord Hale, who distinguished between insanity partial in respect
to particular subjects and insanity partial as to degree.40 While the
older authorities apparently conceived of the mind as divided into
compartments, as noted earlier, medical evidence has now established
a unified mind.41 However, there may be stages of mental irregularity
that are both medically and legally regarded as less than insanity.
42
Human individuality is one and indivisible; but the psychic organs
are many and complex and may vary.43 As Grasset, the noted French
psychiatrist, declares:
"There is a gradation and continuity from the perfectly
reasonable being to the wholly insane. In a general way, it is im-
possible to draw any absolute and fixed line of demarcation between
physiological or normal phenomena and pathological or abnormal
disturbances.""
An individual suffering from a mental disturbance may be the
victim of delusions, hallucinations, or illusions.4 5 Such manifestations
may be present in numerous forms of disorder and at various stages
thereof.46 Hallucinations involve a false sense impression, i. e., "the
patient hears a sound, or sees, feels, or smells an object that has no
objective existence."4 7 Illusions are also sense disorders but they differ
from hallucinations in that, while the latter are sense impressions
without actual stimulus of the sense organ involved (such as hearing
voices without anyone speaking), the former do involve an actual
stimulus.48 Delusions involve a false belief rather than a false sense
impression and perception.4
9




"Ga.ssEr, op. cit. supra, note 12 at 51.
Id. at 50 et seq.
"Id. at 51. See also id. at 887.
"See GLUECK, op. cit. supra, note 2 at 296 et seq.
See GaAssEr, op. cit. supra, note 12 at 77 et seq.
"GLUECK, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 297. "The most usual hallucinations
among the mentally disordered are auditory. The patient hears 'voices' addressing
him in deferential phrase, or insulting him, or commanding him to do certain
acts. ... Hallucinations may result in illegal conduct; their vivid reality and com-
pelling force may lead the patient to commit the most serious crimes, in carrying
out a supposed command from the Deity, or in redressing supposed insults and
threatened injuries."
" Id. at 299. "Thus the eyes of a patient with illusions may actually be stimu-
lated by a red spot of paint, but he may -perceive (interpret) it as a red rose ...
Because of their occurrence in more or less normal states, illusions again illustrate
the undesirability of making any one symptom into a test . . ." Id. at 800.
" Id. at 800. "They therefore constitute a disturbance of the higher activities
of conscious mind, such as the weighing of evidence, formation of conclusions,
passing of judgments."
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"[They] are noticed in the semi-insane to have a char-
acteristic limitation or slight duration which permits the relative
integrity of a large part of the superior phychism. Like the insane,
the semi-insane may have false visual or auditory sensations; both
believe them to be true; but, in spite of that, the semi-insane man
not lacking in reason in any other part of his psychic domain, his
error is partial, or rather, it is short in duration and has not time
to distort the entire 0 center [superior physic center] of the subject.""°
In the case of delusion, we find a progressive pattern of develop-
ment from the earliest stages to extreme conditions. Kraepelin states:
"Rather must we assume that in the many years of pre-
paration the delusion grows only very gradually, that the patients
offer resistance to the suppositions which are thrust upon them, re-
jecting them at first, and then after many inward struggles they are
overpowered. The possibility can, therefore, scarcely be contested on
principle that the development of the malady does not progress
through such a period of preparation with fluctuating delusions.""'
Delusion formations of varying intensities may be symptoms of
numerous types of mental disorder. The various stages of paranoia
2
are accompanied by delusions of persecution or of grandeur.5 3 Jacoby
declares that, in the case of many chronic alcoholics, paranoiac de-
lusions of a more or less systematized nature develop.54 Glueck writes:
GRAssEr, op. cit. supra, note 12 at 101.
KRAEPELim, Mu mc DEPlussrvE INsAmry AND PARA oiA 222 (Robertson
ed., 1921).
'For a discussion of paranoia, its history, and case studies, see FOWERBAUGH,
PsycHo-CLImcAL STUDIEs IN =H PARuom PsYcHosos 1 et seq. (1931). KIAEPE-
LIN, op. cit. supra, note 51 at 207 et seq. presents a comprehensive presentation of
the field of paranoia. See also KRAFFr-EBNG, PSYCHOPATExA SEXUALIS 495 (Rob-
inson ed. 1945); GLuEcK, op. cit. supra, note 2 at 363.
'See GLuEcK, op. cit. supra, note 2 at 300. "In these cases, as the terms
imply, the patients believe themselves to be great personages or the victims of
sinister plots against their lives or fortunes. (It is to be noted that the defendant
in McNaughton's Case, supra note 5, was under a delusion that Sir Robert Peel,
the Prime Minister of England, was plotting against him.) See KRAPE UN, op. cit.
supra, note 51 at 220. "The delusion here usually matures very slowly, taking
many years. At first it remains within the limits of suspicious conjectures, arrogant
and overweening self-conceit, secret hopes; but these draw ever fresh nourishment
from the prejudiced evaluation of the experiences of life, and they became more
and more fixed." Kraepelin discusses delusions of persecution, which he describes
as the most frequent form of paranoia, at 225. The "related" field of delusions
of jealousy is discussed at 229. Delusions of grandeur are described at 232
et seq. Herein the subject may conceive of himself as a great inventor, an indi-
vidual of high descent, or as a saint or prophet.
'JAcoBY, op. cit. supra, note 17 at 299. "The aversion which the marital
consort so often experiences toward the more and more deteriorating alcoholic,
the sexual impotence that follows the long use of alcohol and the marked enfeeble-
ment of judgment constitute the basis upon which these delusions develop. All
kinds of insignificant occurrences furnish the nutriment for the notion of jealousy
until finally the patients are convinced of the infidelity of their conjugal partners.
Gross maltreatment, dangerous physical injury or murder are the resulting of-
fences .... Besides the notion of jealousy, other paranoid semblances may be
present in chronic alcoholics."
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"Alcoholic insanities are but increased degrees of chronic
inebriety, except, that in addition to mental deterioration, there are
delusions, especially of a sexual nature. Delusions of infidelity, com-
mon in these psychoses, may lead to frightful murders; and in view
of the fact that these delusions 'are not necessarily or even usually
continuous,' and are frequently forgotten after they have passed, nice
forensic questions may arise in cases where it is claimed that an
offense was committed as the result of delusion.""
Other types of alcoholic mental disorders may involve illusions
and hallucinations as well as delusions.r6 The state of delirium tre-
mens gives rise to hallucinations of touch and sight.5 7 Glueck calls
this condition "maniacal" and declares:
" 'Acts of violence, horrible in their ferocity and brutality,
are apt to characterize this state. Murders are sometimes committed,
usually accompanied by the most savage mutilations, and often per-
petrated without the slightest provocation, but are generally the
result of frightful hallucinations from which the maniac suffers.' ""
And yet, this maniacal condition subsides and there is rarely any clear
recollection of what transpired during the seizure.-9
Thus, while we may reject the rule of McNaughton's Case that a
so-called insane delusion is a defense only when the facts of the
delusion would be a defense if true, and reject it on the ground that
there is no such thing as what the judges called "partial delusion only,"
we should bear in mind that insanity may be partial as to degree.
The foregoing discussion of the presence of delusion, illusion and
hallucination (they are sometimes erroneously used interchangeably) 60
as they are found in varying stages of mental abnormality should tend
to illustrate this proposition.
As noted earlier, a majority of courts have adopted the position
that the right-and-wrong test of McNaughton's Case is to prevail in
the case of insane delusion as well as in all other forms of insanity.
61
This position is subject to the same criticism that is raised against
the right-and-wrong test in other respects, i. e., that it draws an arbi-
' GLUECK, op. cit. supra, note 2 at 346.
'A See id. at 843 et seq. And see JACOBY, op. cit. supra, note 17 at 343 et seq.
Such disorders as delirium tremens, acute hallucinosis of drinkers, Korsakoff's
psychosis, chronic alcoholism, alcoholic paranoia, etc., are discussed. In addition
to the psychoses having their origin in alcoholic indulgence, there are mental dis-
turbances occasioned by the use of narcotics: morphinism, cocainism, lead intoxi-
cation, etc. These maladies, too, are accompanied -by sense deceptions, hallucina-
tions, and delusions of varying stages. See id. at 301 et seq. Note 40 Ky. L. J.
311, 320 (1952). See WmozrN, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 92 et seq.
m JACOBY, op. cit. supra, note 17 at 289; GLurECK, op. cit. supra, note 2 at 345.
GLUECK, op. cit. supra, note 2 at 345.
Ibid.
Id. at 298.
" Supra note 27.
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trary line between complete insanity and complete sanity. The former
is a defense, the latter entails complete responsibility. There is no
middle ground.
62
The better view would seem to be that insane delusion is not a
separate form of mental illness which is to be subject either to the
same or to a different test. Delusion, like hallucination and illusion,
is rather a manifestation or symptom of mental disease and is subject
to gradations and variations just as the mental abnormality itself.
3
Some writers have suggested that the presence and extent of delusion
might constitute a test with which to measure the various stages of
partial insanity.
6 4
Whether or not the judges in McNaughton's Case intended to
soften the strict rule of absolute responsibility or irresponsibility when
they mentioned such "partial delusion only," their efforts have tended
to confuse rather than to clarify the law of insanity. Manifest injustice
frequently is the result.
The judges did not mention what has since been recognized by
many courts as a softening of the harsh McNaughton rules. Their
test of right-and-wrong does not purport to cover the field of irresistible
impulse.65 A minority of courts"6 have recognized this condition of
' Supra note 9.
' GLUECK, op. cit. supra, note 2 at 175. "'The facts that a man stammers
and that the pupils of his eyes are of different sizes are in themselves no excuse
for crime, but they may be the symptoms of general paralysis of the insane, which
is one of the most fatal forms of the disease. Why should not the existence of a
delusion be as significant as the existence of a stammer?"' (Quoting STEPHEN,
II HISTORY OF THE CnmsiNAL LAW OF ENGLAND 157.) See id at 323 where he
writes: "It is enough to explain why the use of external symptoms as tests of
irresponsibility cannot be satisfactory; namely, that the external symptoms are but
indicative of a much deeper disturbance, the relation of which to the criminal act
can only be arrived at by a process of mental analysis, and may be entirely different
from that which a consideration by the jury of the superfcial evidences of delusion,for example, would indicate."
SId. at 175. Inasmuch as a mental disorder may be accompanied by a de-
lusion or similar manifestation which is the only apparent evidence of maladjust-
ment, we may be confronted with a situation which is deceptively close to that
envisioned by the McNaughton judges when they spoke of such "partial delusion
only. See FOWEBBAUGH, Op. Cit supra, note 52 at 2, citing BLUELER, TFxxrnoox
OF INsANrrY 509 (1924), to the effect that a paranoiac patient may be sound out-
side his delusional system and all that refers to it. KaAEPELIN, Op. Cit. supra, note
51 at 223, says of the paranoiac that: "Activity and conduct often remain without
any very definite disorder. The patients are mostly able even to earn their living
permanently without being specially conspicuous in their surroundings."
In Reg. v. Barton, 3 Cox C. C. 275 (1848) the judge remarked, "The ex-
cuse of an irresistible impulse, co-existing with the full possession of the reasoning
powers might be urged in justification of every crime known to the law-for every
man might be said, and truly, not to commit any crime except under the influence
of some irresistible impulse." See WEIHOFEN, Op. cit. supra, note 5 at 15.
Approximately 17 states and the District of Columbia have added irresistible
impulse to the test for insanity. WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 16 lists the
following states: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois,
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mind wherein the subject knew the nature and quality of the act and
that it was wrong, but was uncontrollably compelled to commit it.
67
A majority of modem jurisdictions have refused to recognize this
second principal effort to alleviate the harsh and inflexible rule of
McNaughton's Case68 (the insane delusion test of McNaughtores Case
being the first). Those courts have subscribed either to the view that
there is no such thing as irresistible impulse69 or that such a state of
mind is too difficult to prove.7 0
It seems quite clear, however, that irresistible or nearly irresistible
impulses may be symptoms of varying stages of insanity.71 This be-
ing true, the courts should take cognizance of their existence and
should indeed go further than courts which already have recognized
them. The present rule allows the victim to be excused only if the
impulse was clearly irresistible and it imposes strict responsibility in
cases where there was any semblance of control over the will power.
72
There is great medical and legal evidence to the effect that there
are numerous types of mental aberration of which a disordered will
Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico,
Ohio, Vermont, Virginia and Wyoming. Of these, he states Louisiana, Massa-
chusetts and New Mexico are doubtful. He further declares: "The U. S. Supreme
Court also seems to have adopted the irresistible impulse test." See also GLUxM,
op. cit. supra, note 2 at 267, for a list of jurisdictions employing the test and an
analysis of cases.
' ". . . he had so far lost the power to choose between the right and wrong,
and to avoid doing the act in question, as that his free agency was at the time
destroyed . . ." Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 866 (1887).
VEXmorEN, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 15.
e It is often contended that irresistible impulse is only unresisted impulse.
Note 34 MICH. L. REv. 569, 570 (1936). See GLVEcK, op. cit. supra, note 2 at 235.
1' See GOODuRT, ESSAYS ON JIuspRUDENcE AND THE CoMMON LAW 47
(1931). And see MEnanrrm, op. cit. supra, note 7 at 61 et seq.; GLUECK, op. cit.
supra, note 2 at 233.
"In contending that a person may by some irresistible impulse be compelled
to some action, the nature of which he knows and knows to be wrong, medical
authorities, after pointing out that insanity more frequently attacks a person's
Will and Emotions than his intellectual power, claim that a conative force of in-
sanity (affecting the will and emotions) may exist alongside an unimpaired intel-
lect. Thus a good and sane intellect may be entirely governed by a corrupted
and insane will. For this reason it is urged that the McNaughton rules, in treat-
ing insanity as a matter of intelligence and not of will, are inadequate and should
be changed in the light of modem medical opinion." MEuAEDrrH, op. cit. supra,
note 7, at 112. See WEmoFEN, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 45. "That there are cases
in which mental unsoundness results in impulsions which are sometimes quite
uncontrollable, is testified to by all psychiatrists." (He cites: KAErmN, LECTUREs
ON CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 314 (1906); NoYES, TEXTBooK OF PSYCHIATRY 86
(1927); PATON, PSYCHIATRY 100 (1905).
7 Comm. v. Rogers, 7 Metc. (Mass.) 500 (1844) .... the question will be,
whether the disease existed to so high a degree, that for the time being it over-
whelmed the reason conscience, and judgment, and whether the prisoner, in com-
mitting the homicide, acted from an irresistible and uncontrollable impulse: If so,
then the act was not the act of a voluntary agent, but the involuntary act of the
body, without the concurrence of a mind directing it." (Writer's italics.) See
GLurEcK, op. cit. supra, note 2 at 807.
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power may be a symptom and that the will power may be either de-
stroyed or only impaired.7
3
Authorities recognize several types of irresistible impulse. The
phrase has been applied to "ldeptomania"-an irresistible impulse to
steal, "pyromania"--an irresistible impulse to set fires, and "homicidal
mania"-an irresistible impulse to kill.74 Weihofen adds "dipsomania"
-an impulse to drink75-to this list and declares:
"Impulsions may be present in a number of disorders ...
It seems most cases of pathologic impulses concern abnormalities of
the sex life."7 '
The suggestion of sexual abnormality raises the question of the so-
called sex crime which is an increasingly severe and vexing problem
for the courts. 7 Krafft-Ebing, a distinguished authority in this field,
declares that "When the sexual instinct is perverse (states of psychical
degeneration), it may, at the same time, be so intensified as to be
irresistible."7 8 He goes on, however, to describe circumstances in
which the impulse may be something less than irresistible. 79 When
this condition exists, he declares:
"(It) exerts an influence on the motive of the incriminat-
ing act; and a just judge, notwithstanding the lack of legal irrespon-
sibility due to mental defect or disease, will recognize the circum-
stances which ameliorate the heinousness of the crime."'
And yet, while we find in the legal concept of irresistible impulse an
"See GLtmx, op. cit. supra, note 2 at 304, 307 et seq.; WEmioFEN, op. cit
supra 5 at 45.
' GLucx, op. cit. supra, note 2 at 304.
' GLUEcac, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 45, n. 85. Glueck defines dipsomaniacs
as . . . those who are ... at certain periods .. . seized with the most un-
controllable cravings for alcohol .. . ." op. cit. supra, note 2 at 344. "William
James in his Psychology reports the case of a dipsomaniac, an inmate of an alms-
house in Ohio, who, driven by the craving for alcohol, deliberately amputated
his arm with an axe and ran into the main hall begging for a bowl of water and
some alcohol. The attendants, who saw the bleeding stump, were horrified and
did as he wished. He immersed the bleeding stump into the basin of water and
alcohol for a moment or two, and with the uninjured hand raised the bowl, drank
the contents of alcohol, blood, and water in a few gulps, and heaved a sigh of
relief." Note N. Y. UNIv. L. REv. 518 (1937). JACOBY, op. cit. supra, note 17 at
301, declares that chronic misuse of narcotics, like the chronic misuse of alcohol,
also leads to mental derangement. In the use of morphine, he relates, the will
power becomes markedly affected from the very beginning.
' WEmOFEN, op cit. supra, note 5 at 45, n. 85.
"Criminal statistics prove the sad fact that sexual crimes are progressively
increasing in our modern civilization." KmA Fr-EBING, op. cit. supra, note 52 at
498. "In no domain of criminal law is cooperation of judge and medical expert
so much to be desired as in that of sexual delinquencies; and here only anthropol-





apparent attempt to soften the inflexible rules of McNaughton's Case,
the minority of courts upholding it have failed to allow for the impulse
that is less than irresistible. They have fallen into the same error
that they sought to alleviate and have left no room for intermediary
stages of mental disorder and their accompanying semi-responsibility.
Thus, we find that not only have the courts established by ancient
precedent a rigid test of right-and-wrong which allows no room for
partial or semi-insanity, but, also, that the courts which have sought
to alleviate the problem by introducing the concept of irresistible
impulse have also imposed a rigid test that demands the impulse be
completely irresistible or it is no defense. Again there is no middle
ground; again there is no mitigation.
Therefore, in the law of insanity, there is a crying need for reform.
The psychiatric recognition of semi-insanity and semi-responsibility de-
mands that the law be revised so as to alleviate its present inadequacy
and injustice. What then should be adopted by the courts as a reason-
able solution to this problem? There have been two avenues of mod-
em approach to a legal recognition of semi-insanity and semi-respon-
sibility. Under the first method, the courts have viewed the criminal
act and determined whether the offender was in such a state of mind
as to be capable of the essential elements of that crime as defined by
the law. In short, the inquiry is: What crime was committed?"' Thus
the various elements of murder, burglary, etc., are analyzed in con-
nection with the defendant's state of mind at the time of committing
the act.8 2 This method has received growing favor among the courts
in the realm of homicide where first degree murder has been reduced
to second degree murder because the mental condition of the defen-
dant precluded the premeditation which is requisite for murder in
the first degree.83
The law has long recognized the fundamental principle that one
who suffers from the effects of alcoholic intoxication may be con-
sidered as not having the specific intent necessary to certain crimes.84
The United States Supreme Court left the door open for extension of
1"Weihofen and Overholser, Mental Disorder Affecting the Degree of
Crime, 56 YA.LE L. J. 959, 962 (1947).
12 Ibid.
6Id, at 964. Taylor, op. cit. supra, note 9 at 636.
"'See Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard, House of Lords (1920) A.C.
479, 499 (1920). ". . . where a specific intent is an essential element in the
offense, evidence of a state of drunkenness rendering the accused incapable of
forming such an intent should be taken into consideration in order to determine
whether he had in fact formed the intent necessary to constitute the particular
crime. If he was so drunk that he was incapable of forming the intent required
he could not be convicted of a crime which was committed only if the intent was
proved." And see Taylor, op. cit. supra, note 9 at 635.
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this doctrine in the case of Hopt v. United States 5 where it was de-
clared that a lesser crime may be committed where the defendant is
incapable of specific intent because of "intoxication or otherwise."80
(Writer's italics.)
In the recent case of Fisher v. United States,87 the Supreme Court
was confronted with a situation where the defendant knew the nature
and quality of the act he was committing and undoubtedly knew it
was wrong. But yet he was somewbat feeble-minded, was prone to
excitability, was on the occasion of the crime stirred to great wrath,
terrified and angered by subsequent developments, and finally killed
in order to alleviate the situation. The defendant, a Negro, was em-
ployed as a janitor in a library. He was constantly scolded by the
white lady librarian who, he discovered, had reported his poor work
to the supervisor. Perhaps as a result of his feeble-mindedness, on the
occasion that the librarian scolded him and called him a "black nigger,"
he was so enraged that he struck her. She ran to the window scream-
ing. She continued to scream despite his pleas to stop. He was
frantic, he picked up a wooden object and knocked her senseless. He
then carried her into another room and busily proceeded to clean up
the blood. She came to and began screaming again. He pleaded
and pleaded for her to stop and finally in blind desperation he cut
her throat.88
The majority of the Court affirmed his conviction for murder in
the first degree. There were two stormy dissents in which the prin-
ciple of reducing the grade of the offense was advanced.8 9 It was
argued that the jury should be instructed to the effect that, while a
mental disorder may not be so great as to excuse entirely, it may still
be considered as reducing the offense to lesser crime according to
its statutory definition. A jury, they declared, should be permitted
to determine whether or not there were such deliberation and pre-
meditation as are required by Congress for the crime of murder in
the first degree. 90 The majority simply applied the right-and-wrong
104 U.S. 631 (1881).
" When a statute establishing different degrees of murder requires deliberate
premeditation in order to constitute murder in the first degree, the question
whether the accused is in such a condition of mind, by reason of drunkenness or
otherwise, as to be incapable of deliberate premeditation, necessarily becomes a
material subject of consideration by the jury." 104 U.S. 631, 634 (1881).
'828 U.S. 463 (1946).
The salient facts of the case are described in best detail by Justice Frank-
furter in his dissent, at 477. Taylor, op. cit. supra, note 9 at 626, describes and
analyzes the circumstances of the case.
Frankfurter's dissent starts at 477; Murphy's opinion appears at 490.
Murphy declares, at 492, ". . . there are persons who, while not totally
insane, possess such low mental powers as to be incapable of the deliberation and
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test of McNaughton's Case and found him guilty. They did not, how-
ever, reject the logic advanced by Justices Frankfurter and Murphy
in their respective dissents. They merely stated that such a change
in the established law should not begin in the Supreme Court but
should stem from statutory enactment or at least from the decision
of the District Court.9 ' Thus the case was actually a victory for this
were noncommital.
Weihofen and Overholser, in a recent article, 92 declare that about
half of the nation's courts have adopted the concept that a defendant
may suffer from such a mental disturbance that, while not excusing
entirely, it will reduce the grade of the offense. In other words, they
recognize that the defendant's mental state may be such that he could
not have had the necessary intent or premeditation required by sta-
tute of the crime with which he is charged.9 3 Thus he is convicted
of a lesser crime.04
This system represents a large and growing effort on the part of
the courts to correct the present situation. However, this method is
at best only mechanical and is nothing more than a step in the right
direction. Thus far it has seen wide use only in the case of reducing
murder from the first to the second degree. 5 This application is ob-
viously limited to those states which have some statutory difference
between the two, e. g., presence of premeditation. 96 Only a very few
courts have allowed partial insanity to reduce the offense to man-
slaughter. 97 It would appear that a much wider application of the
doctrine is advisable.
A more reasonable but procedurally more difficult approach to
the problem lies in simple mitigation of the gravity of the offense. In
premeditation requisite to statutory first degree murder. Yet under the rule
adopted by the court below, the jury must either condemn such persons to death
on the false premise that they possess the mental requirements of a first degree
murderer or free them completely from criminal responsibility and turn them
loose among society. The jury is forbidden to find them guilty of a lesser degree
of murder by reason of their generally weakened or disordered intellect.
"The Court said at 476: "For this Court to force the District of Columbia
to adopt such a requirement for criminal trials would involve a fundamental
change in the common law theory of responsibility .... Such a radical departure
from the common law concepts is more properly a subject for the exercise of the
legislative power or at least for the discretion of the courts of the District."
doctrine. The dissenting judges were in favor of it and the others
Op. cit. supra, note 81.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See WEmorFEN, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 109 et seq., where he presents an
exhaustive analysis of cases in the various jurisdictions.
"In those states where there are no degrees of murder there would be no
way to reduce the gravity of the offense by employing this method.
"See the analysis of cases in WEmoFEN, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 109 et seq.
See the early Illinois case, Fisher v. People, 23 Ill. 218 (1859).
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adopting the former approach, the courts have adhered closely to de-
fined limits and reduced one crime to another in accordance with their
statutory definitions. Such a system is artificial and does not strike
at the heart of the problem. For example, as noted earlier, Krafft-
Ebing speaks of sex crimes which involve irresistible impulse and then
he describes circumstances wherein the mental disorder only ". . . ex-
erts an influence on the motive of the incriminating act. . . ."98 In
such case, he declares, ". . . a just judge, notwithstanding the lack
of legal irresponsibility . . . will recognize the circumstances which
ameliorate the heinousness of the crime."99 The idea of mitigating
the offense by taking stock of circumstances is no stranger to the law.
Most criminal statutes provide varying sentences to be imposed as
judge and jury deem advisable under the circumstances. 00 Judges
have always been given great latitude in passing sentence.1' 1 The
law has long recognized that ordinary human frailty will lead to the
perpetration of crimes quite serious in nature and yet involving less
culpability than that contemplated by the punishment associated with
the crime. The courts have allowed the heat of passion arising from
sudden combat or seeing one's wife in adultery to reduce a murder
to manslaughter. 10 2 And yet only a very few courts have permitted
mitigation in the case of mental disorder. 03 Psychiatrists have estab-
"IKRAsFFr-EBiNG, op. cit. supra, note 52 at 503.
ibid.
'As for example, a penal statute may provide that the defendant upon con-
viction shall be imprisoned for not less than 2 nor more than 20 years. Many
states have adopted a system of allowing a jury to mitigate punishment upon evi-
dence of mental defect. See WEFEasOrsa digest, op. cit. supra, note 5at 109
et seq.
" "But both before and since the American colonies became a nation, courts
in this country and in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge
could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist
him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within
limits fixed by law." Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949).
'See Rex v. Manchuck, 4 D. L. R. 737 (1937) where provocation was held
to reduce murder to manslaughter. See also Regina v. Chapman, 12 Cox C. C. 4
(1872); State v. Yang, 74 Conn. 177, 50 AtI. 37 (1901); note 51 HAMv. L. R,.
928 (1938); and note 18 CORNELL L. Q. 376 (1933). See also Taylor, op. cit
supra, note 9 at 637.
" See W mosE's digest of cases, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 109 et seq. Ap-
parently the modem writers are willing to reduce the crime to one of a lesser
degree according to statutory definition but are not willing to assume that the
crime is committed but a lesser punishment attached because of lessened responsi-
bility. Taylor, op. cit. supra, note 9 at 630, declares: "The theory of 'partial',
limited, or 'semi-' responsibility admits, in my opinion, that the defendant is
guilty of the crime charged, but for some reason or other-here, usually partial
insanity-his responsibility should not be of the same degree as that placed upon
a normal individual. My theory is, rather, 'full responsibility, but only for the
crime actually committed." See also WEMIOFEN, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 98-108,
411-415; GLuEcK, op. cit. supra, note 2 at 310, n. 1; Keedy, Insanity and Criminal
Responsibility, 30 HABv. L. REv. 535, 551 (1917); Weihofen, Partial Insanity and
Criminal Intent, 24 ILL. L. RBv. 505, 514 (1930).
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lished that partial insanities may influence criminal acts. Many courts
have tried to alleviate the situation by reducing first degree murder
to second degree. Why not go all the way?
The principal criticism of such an approach might be that it would
open the door to limitless defenses and completely submerge an al-
ready complex and overloaded situation in a sea of further confusion.
However, it has been established that a defendant is entitled to the
defense of insanity. To deny this right is unconstitutional.104 Neither
is it constitutional to convict an offender of a crime and to punish him
for that crime when his mental state is such that he should not bear
full responsibility.'0 5 It is the duty of those who administer the law
to devise a system whereby this obvious injustice may be corrected.
The writer, in an earlier note,100 has suggested and urged the
adoption of a number of reforms in the administration of insanity
as a defense in criminal law, to which the reader is referred.. Briefly,
the reforms suggested include: sorting out those who are obviously
insane before trial, routine mental examination of all those indicted
for crime, abolition of the right-and-wrong test and adoption of the
New Hampshire rule than insanity is a jury question without a fixed
test, establishment of a standard for mental "experts" before they
may be competent witnesses, and a provision for the judge to consult
with state mental authorities before passing sentence. Under such
a program the entire defense of insanity could be much more readily
handled.
Such procedural devices are but the beginnings of a system which
properly developed might well separate and allot to their proper
places those accused of crime but who have varying degrees of partial
insanity.
In conclusion, it may be emphasized that the problem of adminis-
tering the defense of insanity has been inadequately handled by the
courts. The time has come for drastic readjustment both in the
substantive law of definition and also in the procedural law of admin-
istration. It is hoped that the suggestions made in this note for im-
provement and change in both of these will be indicative of some of
the things that should be done and of rational ways to do them.
ROBERT HALL SMrTH
Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931); State v. Strasburg, 60
Wash. 106, 110 Pae. 1020 (1910).
" Taylor, op. cit supra, note 9 at 642. "When a man's life or liberty is at
stake he should be adjudged according to his personal culpability as well as by
the objective seriousness of the crime." Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 492
(1946) (Murphy's dissent).40 Ky. L. J. 311, 820 (1952).
